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ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOR STABILITY
AND PROGRESS: REFLECTIONS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMt*
A.G. Alias*

The people of India, after half a century of democratic experience, once again
have voted for a hung Parliament creating apprehensions of instability at the Centre
and of aggressive regionalism in some parts of the country. In a situation where
accelerated economic and social development is the need of the hour, the country
can ill afford the luxury of another general elections which again does not promise
stability. While a grim scenario is not necessarily predicted given the democratic
spirit of the people, it is imperative for right thinking citizens to prepare the
institutional mechanisms to respond adequately so that the basic structure of the
Constitution
is maintained against all challenges. A question that deserves
consideration is the possibility of a directly elected President as the chief executive
of the nation. Such a provision would not alter the "basic" features of the Constitution,
and can be effected by an ordinary amendment of a few Constitutional provisions.
Indeed the Constituent Assembly in 1948-49 seriously considered adopting a
Presidential form of Government as in the American model, but later decided against
it - determining that the Westminister model was best suited, or "safer", for a
fledgling democracy. That argument probably was correct then, but no longer, as
democracy has matured enough in India. When instability and uncertainty reign at
the Centre for too long, disastrous consequences including attempts for a military
take-over, or disintegration of the "Indian Union" can follow. Vasant Sathe has been
a leading proponent of a Presidential system. I This article presents some complementary ideas to Sathe's and others' theses.
The idea behind this article is that in a large, multicultural, parliamentary
democracy, rarely occurring, undisputed, charismatic leadership is indispensable to
hold the country together, as Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi had demonstrated (many would
disagree, but think about how Tito held the three warring factions of Yugoslavia
together and what happened after his death), and further to engage in constructive
programmes. How, and to what extent, the continuing lack of such a leadership can

t

A different version entitled "Only a Presidential System Can Ensure Stability at the Centre" has
been published in the November, 96 issue of Legal News and Views.
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Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon has extensively revised the text though he has reservations
points raised in this paper. The author is extremely grateful to him .
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role of the chief executive is the

Though a leader with the charisma, vision, courage as well as the sincerity of
Jawaharlal Nehru is difficult to come by, a leader with moderate charisma and
enough competence in practical matters, as well as a reasonable measure of sincerity
and genuine interest in the country's welfare, is not at all hard to find. V.P. Singh,
A.B. Vajpayee, Deve Gowda, C. Achutha Menon (Chief Minister of Kerala, CPI,
1970-77) and A.K. Antony are all good examples. Such a leader, however, can
usually command the respect and following of only a smaller group of people. In
a parliamentary system, such leaders head either smaller parties or smaller groups
in a large party, but can hardly emerge as strong national leaders commanding the
following of, say, 40-60% of the population. Given a chance, and just enough
constitutional authority, quite a few of these "ordinary" leaders can at least "manage", if not "lead" the country; the better (leader) they are the better off will the
country be, but their lack of charisma is unlikely to create instability as in 1977-80,
and in 1989-91, as at present. In a parliamentary system, even if they are elected to
the top, such leaders ordinarily do not get a chance to govern the country; either they
have to expend most of their effort to stay in office or risk an almost sure defeat in
a routine no-confidence motion. Therefore, it is imperative that the chief executive,
President or Prime Minister, must be "released" from the hold of the chota leaders
in the Parliament to perfonn his executive duties. The Parliament should only have
the powers either to nullify unreasonable, or "unpopular," specific actions of the
chief Executive, or direct him/her to act with legislations, either with simple or
higher majority, as appropriate. According to democratic principles, this can be
logical only if the chief executive is popularly elected. To circumvent the logistical
constraints of such an electoral process, and further to make the election more
meaningful, creating an Electoral College consisted of the Panchayat members and
Municipal Councillors, to elect the Chief Executive, is suggested.
A parliamentary system would work well if there were a well-balanced two
party system. On the contrary, multiplicity of parties with hardly any national appeal
has occupied the centre stage exercising disproportionate political clout in decision
making. What we had, until 1984, was a monolithic party system headed by
unusually charismatic leaders, Jawabarlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. It was nothing
short of a miracle, one could argue, that a father-daughter duo was able to run this
huge, heterogeneous nation for most of its first 37 years. We took that stability for
granted. When that faith was extended to a third generation of the "dynasty", the
recipient, Rajiv Gandhi, simply fumbled, and he soon lost more than half of his
strength. (History is full of such examples where a weak emperor, after inheriting
an empire would lose control of parts or whole of it.) Since then we have witnessed
real coalition governments at the Centre. If the coalition Government of Deve
Gowda lasts for the full five years, that would also be a miracle. For the natural order
of things, it should be a repetition of the instability of 1977-80 and 1989-91. The
stability of the Nehru-Indira era is very unlikely to continue other than in spurts as
the Rao ministry, in the present parliamentary system.
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Moreover, by creating a presidential system, the powers of the Executive and
of the Legislature can be clearly separated. In the present parliamentary system, the
separating line is blurred and both powers tend to gravitate towards the Prime
Minister as he becomes more popular, charismatic or authoritarian. Nehru ruled
more like a benevolent dictator. Mrs. Gandhi came close. Even Rajiv Gandhi and
Narasimha Rao looked, from time to time, more as authoritarian rulers than
consensus builders. On the other hand, when the Prime Minister is inherently weak,
either due to a precarious majority, or due to lack of charisma, or both, the powers
of the Prime Minister tend to dissipate from his office. A Prime Minister of the 'Mrs.
Gandhi-type', by controlling both the Executive and the Legislature, tends to
become far more powerful than a President, whereas a Prime Minister of 'Charan
Singh-type' is far less powerful than a President. The President would not have to
worry about a 'no-confidence' motion and he could carryon with his business of
running the executive branch by the sheer authority (and stability) of his office, as
Gerald Ford did in the USA at a very turbulent time with his modest leadership
calibre and charisma.
Whatever be the type of Government, the Chief Executive must have sufficient
powers, but not as much as Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi had exercised, for the smooth
operation of the governmental machinery. As the famous dictum states, "power
corrupts, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely," unlimited powers concentrated in one individual is naturally dangerous. Sathe in his book has dispelled the
fears of those who felt that the proposed President could command unlimited powers
endangering democratic institutions. As the President's powers will be specific and
strictly limited, and neither too 'elastic' nor 'shrinkable' as in the case of the Prime
Minister, it is extremely difficult for the President to abuse his powers. The President
does not (and should not) have control over the Legislature, whereas the Prime
Minister can control the Legislature as well as the Executive. Further, the proposed
vast powers and responsibilities of the Parliament should also include, as part of its
duties, keeping a vigil for signs of any tendency on the part of the President to abuse
his executive powers, and promptly check it. Lastly, if we take the example of Russia
with no democratic tradition, under Boris Yeltsin with his vast executive powers,
democracy is flourishing, at least for the time being. If the elected Yeltsin lacked
those executive powers, there could have been more upheavals and coups, and
democracy itself may have been the casualty.
The very term democracy denotes that the ultimate power, or all powers
ultimately, lie in the people. But logistical constraints limit the people from voicing
their opinion cogently on every matter and therefore, in effect; they delegate that
authority to the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. When, say, two-thirds,
but not a simple majority, of a legislative body voice an opinion, it is closest to the
popular opinion and ought to be treated as the ultimate decision of the represented
people. Therefore, it appears contrary to democratic principles to assign 'equal'
powers to the three fundamental (executive, legislative, and judicial) branches of the
government. The powers of the Legislature, being a large body and elected by the
universal adult franchise, should be greater than those of and inclusive of both the
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Executive and even the Judiciary. The supremacy of the Parliament ought to be
unambiguously and specifically- stated and described in the Constitution.
The powers of the Judiciary could be more precisely defined. Judges should
not have an unlimited authority to invalidate the elected Legislature's or Executive's
actions. Naturally, the Judiciary should have its traditional independence. The
judges can best look at an issue objectively and assess it impassively. However,
judges too are human and they do err. Attributing too much sanctity to them can only
colour the necessarily respectable Judiciary with totalitarian shades. In Constitutional matters, there should be a balance between the impact of judicial verdicts and
the democratic rights of the people exercised through the actions of elected officials.
Although so far the Judiciary has done a commendable job in India, from time to
time, individual judges tend to be more concerned with the letter of the law than the
spirit of the law. A case in point: It was apparent that the Allahabad High Court
verdict of 1975 on Mrs. Indira Gandhi's election was unjust and avoidable in the
circumstances. The verdict was eventually overturned by a Full Bench of the
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the damage to the whole country was already done with
that prolonged Emergency and the abuse of executive powers for the first time, and
the ensuing repercussions.
CONSTITUTIONS

REFLECT

VALUES AND LEGALITY

The success of a constitution does not entirely depend on how it is worded (an
unfortunate reality), which is only one of the important factors. Some important
ingredients of a constitution could remain unwritten. Certain clauses can only be
worded ambiguously. Often many aspects of a constitution have to be "interpreted".
Such interpretations may rigidly conform to or widely deflect from the original
nature of the document depending upon who does it and how and under what
circumstances they are done. For example, the US Supreme Court often rules on the
constitutionality of legislative acts. The problem that has built up around such
judicial reviews is that there has been little consistency. It is not uncommon to find
disturbing, even confusing contradictions, sometimes in five-to-four split decisions
reflecting the personal views of individual justices in judicial reviews. Such situations challenge the democratic foundations, and tend to undermine peoples' confidence
in constitutional governance.
Constitutional experts differentiate between "normative" and "nominal" constitutions. The clauses of a normative constitution are fully activated and habitually
implemented, whereas a "nominal" constitution hardly reflects the political realities
of the State. Both the 1936 constitution of the former Soviet Union and the 1954
constitution of China guaranteed freedom of speech which, however, was implemented in the Soviet Union only after Mikhail Gorbachev came into power, and is
yet to be satisfactorily implemented in China.
In France, the constitution of the Third Republic (1870-1940), in spite of its
inherent instability, served for 70 years. Although the Constitution of the Fourth
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Republic (1940-1958) was designed to provide more stable governments, the life of
the average cabinet was shorter than that of the Third Republic. In the 1950' s, during
the Algerian independence movement, the French Government was almost paralysed
by frequent changes of cabinet. Finally, General de Gaulle took the initiative and
the Constitution was re-written, thus creating the present Fifth Republic, in which
the President has greater and real powers. Since 1958, French cabinets have been
stable and the Constitution proved resilient indeed. In Italy, the instability still
continues.
In the US, the two party system, in effect, is translated into the Presidency
forming one "party" and the Congress (parliament) forming the other. Both the
President and the members of Congress are elected without too much regard for party
loyalty. Thus, the American democracy is "partyless" to an extent. The US, though
unified by language, is large and diverse. The 200 plus years of stability, the
phenomenal success in material growth, and its leading role in world affairs during
most of this century, must have had something to do with its presidential system of
. "partyless" democracy. Moreover, the prolonged and bloody civil war of the 1860s
did not fragment the US, in spite of its vast, sparsely populated territory. The
presidential system must have decisively helped to prevent its disintegration durng
those civil war years. In the US, there is mutual respect between the Presidency and
the Congress which is partly due to mutual dependence and also from gradually
evolved tradition. Such mutual respect appears to be of utmost importance.
RISKS

OF UNGUIDED

DEMOCRACY

Aristotle preached at length to the Greeks about democracy. But his democracy
was essentially confined to the aristocracy, and he condoned slavery. Similarly, the
U.S. democracy fostered slave trade. Even Thomas Jefferson owned slaves. Further,
until the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, the US democracy maintained a
'disguised apartheid' system, for 100 years after the abolition of slavery. Such a twotier system exists in India also, where strictly speaking, only the educated and the
affluent and the upper castes, or rather the "privileged class", who are now referred
to as the "middle-class", a misnomer for India, enjoy the fruits of democracy. As
the "G- 7" economic superpowers often seem to forget that (most) people in South
and Southeast Asia are really humans, the Indian "middle class" does not seem to
recognise that the lower third of the Indian populous is really human.
One political theorist made a very apt statement about democracy: "I do not
consider that democracy is the ideal political system, nevertheless, I advocate
democracy for the simple reason that I have no better alternative to suggest."
Democracy as such has certain inherent weaknesses. As a rule, it is weak in getting
things moving. The worst aspect of democracy, however, has unfortunately a lot to
do with one of its fundamental and noble aspects, i.e., the treatment of each
individual with respect, observing all his rights, and not regarding him as a small
organ of a huge body, the society. When the civil rights of an individual, say those
of a suspected white collar criminal, are fully observed, unfortunately, many other
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individuals' similar rights may indirectly and imperceptibly be infringed upon.
Similarly, in the US, an obsession with the rigid observation of (inflated) individual
rights of the accused has created a sense of fearlessness and security in both white
collar (as in India) and street criminals, leading to the escalation of all crimes.
Democracy can progress in another direction, i.e., by implementing more and
more socialistic programmes, which is far more important for the lower half of
people in India. In fact one could argue that democracy is incomplete without
socialism and that socialism is incomplete without democracy. Franklin Roosevelt
in the USA, and Mikhail Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union have more or less
proved this point through their actions. Some strange logisitics, however, limit the
blossoming together of democracy and socialism - rather, either tends to grow at the
expense of the other. In the current vocabulary of US politicians, democracy and
free-market capitalism, curiously, are inseparable, though a real "free-market"
hardly exists in the USA. Without digressing too much, one simple example is the
remarkable, government regulated, stability of US domestic, wholesale sugar price
during the past several decades, as opposed to wildly fluctuating world sugar prices,
with its terrible consequences to the Third World sugar cane farmers and consumers.
Note that cane sugar is the cheapest source of calories, harmless up to 200 gms a
day for a manual laborer but less for others. Locally manufactured soft drinks
can be retailed for about two rupees (Rs. 2/-) in a non-disposable plastic bottle of
300-500 ml, with initial government subsidies to boost the consumption level close
to that of US). For a poor country with limited resources, such as India or China,
it is a dangerous trend to become obsessed with individual rights. According to
published statistics (e.g. 1989 Year Book of Encyclopaedia Britannica), the per
capita incomes of India and China have been very close, but in China the overall
quality of life, as measured by infant and maternal mortalities, life expectancy, and
literacy, had approached that of the industrialized, affluent countries by the late
1980's, while, with the exception of Kerala, India is still not much better than the
poorest nations of the world. If individual rights, much less our recent/current
"economic liberalisation", are that costly, they are not worth the price.
Kerala's unique progress, largely through literacy and a more equitable
distribution of available resources, has attracted world-wide interest and is hailed as
the "Kerala model." Many realistic economists and environmentalists conclude that
only a "Kerala model", also dubbed as "progress without growth", can sustain
indefinitely. They advocate it not only for other developing world but also for the
. developed world. The importance granted to women, education promoted by the
Catholic church, the progressive minded Sri Chithira Thirunal (the last maharaja of
Travancore) and, above all, the communist movement, which had been tamed by the
Centre, under the leadership of E.M.S. and Achutha Menon, all have contributed to
the development of the "Kerala model".
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SOME THOUGHTS

Since constitutional changes are very serious and risky, it may be wiser to
revise our constitution incrementally in stages, first dealing with the Centre, while
the State's constitutional functioning remains as such, and at a later date, after
examining the degree of success (or failure) at the Centre, revising the State's
administrative system.
The Executive and the Legislature may be separately elected. Both should be
stable and powerful. The main objective is the creation of a strong Centre, giving
the chief executive vast powers to improve the effectiveness of the governmental
machinery, together with an equally strong "decentralization", up to the Panchayat
level, to check the abuses of governmental powers.

The Chief Executive
The "Chief Executive" , who may be given a suitable title like President, should
ideally be elected by the entire adult population which, however, may not be
practical in the near future. Instead, he/she may be elected for a seven year term by
the people's immediate representatives, the Panchayat membels and Municipal
Councillors (but excluding M.Ps. and state legislators) forming an Electoral College,
under the strict supervision of the Election Commission. To become eligible to be
considered by the Electoral College, the candidate (an Indian citizen, preferably
between the ages of 40 and 60) should have, say, 2,000 "primary endorsement"
Electoral College votes from an area with no more than, say, 3,000 votes. The
Electoral College will assemble in as few places as possible, for weeks, until the
President is finally elected. (Assembling all electoral college members from, say,
one state or one district, in one place will help them focus on the election, and discuss
and deliberate and judge the candidates better, analogous to how the jurors do in a
jury trial. In a typical election, almost anywhere in the world, only a minority casts
their votes with sufficient deliberation and conviction.) Through closed circuit
television, each presidential candidate will get liberal time to address the Electoral
College, in addition to participating in a series of debates, press conferences, etc. The
election may be conducted by a successive elimination procedure: The candidates
who get less than 5-7 % of the votes in the first ballot will be eliminated, if none gets
more than 50% of the votes. In the second ballot, all except the top two, if none gets
more than 50% of the votes, will be eliminated. In the third and final ballot the top
two will face each other and the candidate who wins will be the Chief Executive/
President.
It is further desirable that there be a provision in the Constitution that the
parliament reviews at 28 month intervals (i.e., twice before the next election), the
overall performance of the Chief Executive, and if 75% of the M.Ps. present but not
less than 70% of the total M.Ps. elected are dissatisfied with his performance, they
can simply vote him out of office. (The argument is that if the Chief Executive is
so inept that he cannot keep the loyalty of at least 25% of the M.Ps. as opposed to
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that of 50% at almost all the time in a parliamentary system, he may not deserve his
office.) Such a termination can take place at any time if, say, 85% of the total
members vote for it.
The Chief Executive may be temporarily replaced by the Speaker of the
Parliament when it becomes necessary by death or expulsion until a successor is
elected by the Electoral College. Further, the Chief Executive is expected to consult
or discuss with the Speaker regarding important matters, just as Prime Minister
consults with the opposition leader. Thus a well-balanced "two party system" can
be created by carefully balancing between the Presidency and the Parliament otherwise, it may be impossible for this two party system to evolve spontaneously.
While a Deputy Speaker for the Parliament is necessary, a 'Vice-president' may be
unnecessary, further, it might even be confusing.
The Chief Executive will have vast powers and his executive orders on various
matters shall be obeyed by the concerned officials, but such orders would be
overruled by, say, 65% of the members present but not less than 60% of the total
members of Parliament. He may veto any legislation passed by the Parliament,
which the Parliament can override by 65% of the members present, but not less than
60% of the total members. He may declare a 'State of Emergency' but that must be
ratified by the Parilament within days to continue to be effective.
The Chief Executive would become the head of all the Central Government
employees. As a safety measure, it may be desirable if the Parliament controlled all
Defence Services. He would form a cabinet, the members of which would be his
advisors and they would be responsible to him; they may not be M.Ps. It is desirable
to have a provision in the constitution (as in the USA) whereby the major appointments by the Chief Executive, Cabinet members etc., become effective only if the
Parliament approves such appointments by a simple majority of the members
present.

The Parlwment
The Lok Sabha should become the actual Parliament in every respect. The
number of its members may be increased to, say, 1,000 - one M.P. for a population
of about one million. The M.Ps. may also be elected for a seven year term. The
election procedure may be about the same as it is today. There should be a provision,
as in the case of the Chief Executive, that the respective Panchayat members and
Municipal Councillors review, at 28 month intervals, the overall performance of the
M.P., and if 75% of the respective "Electoral College" members present, but not less
than 70% of the total, are dissatisfied with his performance, the M.P. loses his seat
and a by-election is called to elect a new M.P., whose term would end when the
parliament is dissolved following the next election.
The Parliament, in addition to having all the powers and responsibilities of the
present Lok Sabha, should become the "supreme body" of the nation, and no official
including the Chief Executive, could challenge its ultimate authority. The Parliament
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could by a majority of 65% of the members present but not less than 60% of the total
members, dismiss any or all of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Defence Services and
any other senior officials.

The Rajya Sahha
The Rajya Sabha may be modified as a small council of, say, 50 members, of
which about 45 may be elected and sent from the States and Union Territories with
a minimum of one representative each for most States and Union Territories, and
a maximum of four for any State. The rest are to be nominated by the Chief
Executive with the approval of the Parliament by a simple majority. ~t is desirable
for all ex-Chief Executives to become Rajya Sabha members. The members may
preferably have the minimum qualifications to be appointed as High Court Judges.
Their function may be mostly "academic" in that they examine various aspects of
any issue and submit considered opinions (collectively and individually), secretly
or openly, depending upon the nature of the issue, to the Parliament and the Chief
Executive. They should have the liberty to examine any State document, attend the
Parliament, and participate in its discussions when in session. The Chief Executive
or the Parliament may seek their opinion and advice on any matter.
The Rajya Sabha may have liberal privileges, but no specific powers. Nevertheless, its opinion should be held in high esteem and respected by the three branches
of the State.

An Alternative Way to Make the Chief Executive's Office More Stable
The new Israeli model of directly electing, separately from the Parliament, the
Prime Minister can be adopted with some modifications by a constitutional amendment, and the proposed revision of the constitution may be halted with that for the
near-term. At a future date, a comprehensive Presidential system of Government
may be introduced.
Instead of the seven year term, the Prime Minister may be elected, as suggested
above by the Electoral College of the Panchayat members and Municipal Councillors, for a five year term. No other election procedures need to be altered fot the
near-term. The P.M. will form a Cabinet about as the above suggested Presidential
cabinet. The Cabinet members need not be M.Ps., but the Parliament must approve
the Cabinet members, individually, up to a certain level - all full Cabinet rank
Ministers, or plus Ministers of State, and so on. The P.M. (with his cabinet) cannot
be voted out by the Parliament by a simple majority. Major necessary bills, such as
the Budget, will be presented by the respective ministers at the scheduled time. The
Parliament may amend the bills, but unless it passes the amended bill within a
reasonable time, the originally submitted bill, say the Budget, will automatically be
considered as passed, and it is sent for the President's signature. The P.M. may have
veto power, but the Parliament may override his veto with a reasonable majority. The
overriding of a veto should not constitute the nullification of the Cabinet, or its loss
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of any powers. The President will be retained with his current powers, except to
invite a party leader M.P. to form a Cabinet and to dissolve the Parliament at the
advice of the P.M.
What is presented here are stray thoughts for expert analysis based on
comparative perspectives and to evoke popular debates to effect the largest possible
consensus for change. Democracy, secularism and socialism must remain and get
strengthened further. Only institutional restructuring with minimum constitutional
change must be attempted, lest the motive should get challenged and the initiative
aborted. One thing is certain that to face the challenges of the next millennium in
an increasingly competitive world, there is no alternative to a strong and stable
government at the Centre, as well as in the States.

